The NHL’s next expansion is being discussed as a race between 4 cities.
365247 Sports analyses the 4 potential markets: Houston, Austin, Atlanta and Phoenix.
Houston and Austin are competing for a Texas franchise that could become Team 33 as soon as the 2029/30 season. Dan Friedkin’s Pursuit Sports has agreed to a $2 billion expansion fee, the NHL expects the full investment including a new arena to approach $3.5 billion, and the proposal could reach the Board of Governors before the end of 2026. Atlanta and Phoenix sit behind Texas in the process, with Bill Daly confirming ongoing discussions in both markets around a possible 34th franchise.
What $2 Billion Buys
The $2 billion expansion fee looks huge beside Vegas and Seattle, but NHL team values have climbed even faster. Vegas paid $500 million in 2016 when the average NHL franchise was worth $517 million, so its entry price was 97% of league average. Seattle paid $650 million in 2018 against an average value of $630 million, or 103%. Forbes now puts the average NHL franchise at $2.2 billion, which makes Friedkin’s proposed $2 billion Texas fee 91% of the value of an average team.
Average NHL franchise value has grown from $517 million in 2016 to $2.2 billion today, about 17.5% a year. Expansion pricing has moved from $500 million to $2 billion at roughly 14.9% a year. Friedkin is paying 4 times Vegas’ entry fee, but the average NHL team is now worth more than 4 times as much.
Dallas is valued at around $2.3 billion on $250 million of annual revenue and $70 million of operating income. Vegas is worth $2.2 billion on the same $250 million of revenue and $77 million of operating income. Friedkin’s $2 billion fee equals roughly 8 times Dallas’ revenue and 28.6 times operating income. Once the arena and development take the total commitment to about $3.5 billion, the investment reaches roughly 14 times revenue and 50 times operating income against a mature NHL benchmark.
Utah makes the comparison tougher. Smith Entertainment Group paid $1.2 billion in 2024 for the Coyotes’ hockey assets and franchise rights, including the roster, draft assets, staff and an organisation ready to play. Friedkin is paying around 67% more only two years later, before Texas has a commercial operation, fan base or permanent arena. The $2 billion gets him NHL membership, player access, national revenue participation, league IP and protected territory. Another roughly $1.5 billion has to build the arena, premium inventory, naming rights, concessions, parking, concerts, sponsorship business and surrounding development.
Existing owners have a very different view of the price. Seattle’s $650 million fee paid $21.67 million to each of 30 eligible clubs. Split a $2 billion Texas fee equally across 32 teams and the gross figure becomes $62.5 million per club. Add a second franchise at the same price and expansion proceeds rise to $4 billion, or $125 million per franchise.
How Big Is the Real NHL Market?
Houston has approximately 7.90 million metro residents, Atlanta 6.48 million, Phoenix 5.23 million and Austin 2.62 million. For an NHL owner, the question is how many of them can realistically make a weekday game over and over again.
Atlanta shows how quickly the addressable market falls once travel time is taken into account. North Point’s 2026 analysis found 3 million to 4 million people within 25 miles, enough to rank 13th against NHL markets. Cut the catchment to a 30-minute drive and only 1.4 million people remain, ranking 24th. Almost 78% of Atlanta’s 6.48 million metro population sits outside the 30-minute catchment. North Atlanta is essentially giving up reach to put hockey closer to a smaller, wealthier customer base.
Even then, access is a major issue. South Forsyth’s transportation study assumes 2.8 attendees per vehicle, with 25% of weekday spectators arriving between 5 p.m. and 6 p.m. An 18,500 person sellout would create roughly 6,600 attendee vehicles, including about 1,650 in a single peak hour. Alternative transport is expected to reduce vehicle demand by only 2%. The customer can live close to the arena and still face a difficult journey into it.
Houston has far more people, but they are spread across a much larger area. Harris County had 5.05 million residents in 2025, Fort Bend 975,191 and Montgomery 781,194, giving the three counties roughly 86% of the metro population. Growth is moving outward. Harris added 48,695 residents in the latest year, while Fort Bend and Montgomery added 54,174 combined despite having only around 35% as many residents. Montgomery grew 4.0%, Fort Bend 2.5% and Harris 1%.
Moving northwest brings Montgomery County and Bridgeland closer while making Fort Bend and southwest Houston harder to reach. Houston drivers also lost approximately 70 hours to congestion in 2025. A market of 7.90 million can survive some lost reach, but the site decides which customers become harder to serve.
Austin is smaller and much more concentrated. Travis County has 1.39 million residents, Williamson 752,827 and Hays 304,390, together accounting for roughly 93% of the 2.62 million person metro. Since 2020, Travis has grown 7.7%, while Williamson is up 23.6% and Hays 26.3%. The market is stretching quickly in both directions.
Cedar Park keeps the arena close to existing hockey demand and fast growing Williamson County. Moving south improves access toward San Antonio. Central Austin reaches more of the region but brings far higher land costs and direct competition with Moody Center. Austin drivers lost 46 hours to congestion in 2025. With only 2.62 million residents, Austin has far less room to get the location wrong.
Phoenix has 5.229 million residents, including 4.69 million in Maricopa County and 539,380 in Pinal County. Maricopa still holds almost 90% of the market, but Pinal has grown 26.6% since 2020. In the latest recorded year, Pinal generated 40% of the combined Maricopa and Pinal population increase while holding only about 10% of their current population.
Much of the established premium hockey customer remains around Scottsdale, Tempe and the East Valley, while new growth is pushing farther southeast. Phoenix drivers lost approximately 42 hours to congestion in 2025, much lower than Houston.
Houston has to connect a huge customer base spreading in several directions. Austin has to find the right point along a rapidly lengthening north south corridor. Atlanta is reducing a 6.48 million person metro to a 1.4 million person 30 minute catchment in pursuit of a stronger customer. Phoenix has to sit close enough to today’s hockey wealth without falling behind tomorrow’s population growth.
The number worth putting beside every arena proposal is how many qualified customers can reach the building within 30 minutes at 6:30 p.m. on a weekday, and how large the same customer base will be in 2035. Atlanta is currently the only candidate with enough site detail to begin answering it.
What Each Market Could Earn
Houston remains the biggest economy of the 4. The latest comparable GDP data, released in 2026, put 2024 real metro GDP at $758.3 billion, ahead of Atlanta at $604.3 billion and Phoenix at $435.5 billion. Austin reached $268.4 billion in current dollars, while real GDP grew 3.7% in 2024 and 36.4% from 2019 to 2024, the strongest 5-year performance among major US metros. The more current labour market tells the same. By June 2026, Houston supported 3.522 million jobs, compared with 3.128 million in Atlanta, 2.451 million in Phoenix and 1.432 million in Austin. Austin was growing fastest at 1.9% year over year, followed by Phoenix at 1.4%, Houston at 1.1% and Atlanta at 0.4%.
In Houston, Manufacturing produced $126.9 billion in 2024, equal to 16.7% of metro GDP and the highest output of any US metro, while professional services added another $100.9 billion. The fresher set of numbers strengthen the case: Houston exported $177.3 billion of goods in 2025, No. 1 among US metros, while Greater Houston Partnership secured nearly $10 billion of new capital investment and more than 6,000 jobs during the year. Of 683 new business announcements, 29.9% were manufacturing, with major projects from Eli Lilly, Foxconn and Tesla pushing the industrial base further into pharmaceuticals, electronics and advanced manufacturing.
Austin becomes much more competitive when the focus shifts from total GDP to the people working inside the economy. Average hourly wages are $35.85 in Austin, $34.57 in Atlanta, $33.48 in Phoenix and $32.51 in Houston, compared with a US average of $33.54. Austin also has the largest concentration of high paying professional jobs. Management, business and financial operations, computer and mathematical, architecture and engineering, and legal roles make up 28.6% of Austin employment, versus 23.2% in Atlanta, 20.9% in Phoenix and 20.4% in Houston.
Austin has a larger share of well paid business and tech jobs than the US average. Management jobs make up 10.4% of employment, versus 7.2% nationally, while computer and mathematical roles account for 6.5%, nearly double the US average of 3.4%. Software developers are employed at 2.28 times the national concentration. Austin may be far smaller than Houston, but a much larger share of its workforce sits in the income brackets most likely to spend on premium tickets, suites and corporate hospitality.
Atlanta lands somewhere between Houston’s scale and Austin’s concentration. Business and financial occupations account for 9.1% of employment versus 6.8% nationally, while transportation roles make up another 10.9%.
Job growth gives Austin another edge. In June 2026, Austin had 1.43 million nonfarm jobs, up 1.9% YoY. Phoenix had 2.45 million, up 1.4%. Houston had 3.52 million, up 1.1%. Atlanta had 3.13 million, up 0.3%.
For a $3.5 billion NHL investment, Houston offers the deepest economic cushion. Austin has the strongest workforce profile relative to its size and the fastest current growth. Atlanta combines major market scale with a strong professional services base. Phoenix has the biggest future upside, but more of the case still depends on current investment becoming real household purchasing power.
How Much the Arena Site Changes the Deal
Arena location can shift hundreds of millions of dollars inside a $3.5 billion expansion plan. In Houston, a 60 acre site in EaDo at roughly $3.49 million to $4.14 million per acre would cost $209 million to $248 million, equal to 6.0% to 7.1% of total capital before demolition, infrastructure or construction. In Bridgeland, the same 60 acres could cost only $40 million to $65 million, around 1.1% to 1.9%. The cheaper land is still appreciating. Howard Hughes’ single family land sales averaged $751,000 per acre in Q2 2026 versus $648,000 a year earlier, up roughly 16%. Friedkin could save around $150 million to $200 million by moving away from central Houston and still own land in a growing corridor.
Austin makes the site decision more expensive. Central benchmarks around Interstate 35 range from roughly $9.6 million to $15.29 million per acre, putting 60 acres at $576 million to $917 million, or 16.5% to 26.2% of the full $3.5 billion investment before construction starts. The $15.29 million figure comes from a high rise office feasibility model, so it is not a literal arena land quote.
Move farther out and the Austin numbers change. North Mopac puts 60 acres at roughly $276 million. Cedar Park falls to $50 million to $57 million, Round Rock to about $42 million, and land beside COTA can come in below $12 million. The gap between the highest and lowest assumptions is close to $900 million. Friedkin can save huge amounts by moving outward, but cheaper land eventually comes with lower ticket yield, weaker premium demand, less sponsorship value and tougher multi-use economics. No other candidate has a location decision with a spread this large.
Atlanta is further along because both proposals come with a clear property plan. Krause paid $52 million for 84 acres at South Forsyth, around $619,000 per acre. Ernst & Young projects annual property tax from the development rising from about $7.9 million in 2026 to $50.2 million by 2035, with total public revenue reaching roughly $86.2 million before service costs. The TAD covers only 100.3 acres, so most of the value has to be created inside the development.
North Point is a different property bet. New York Life bought the 1.3 million square foot mall for $202 million in 2021. Its 9 parcels have since lost more than $97 million of market value and around 49% of property tax revenue since 2019. The redevelopment now sits inside a 646 acre TAD covering roughly 150 parcels, with a taxable digest of about $265 million. A successful NHL district could lift nearby hotels, offices, retail and other property well beyond the arena site. South Forsyth is building value from relatively cheap land. North Point is trying to revive an impaired district.
Phoenix shows why a cheap parcel can become expensive very quickly. The Coyotes’ final proposal targeted 110 acreswith an auction starting at $68.5 million. The site also needed more than $80 million of public infrastructure, while ownership committed more than $100 million for roads, water, sewer and other enabling work. Using the owner commitment, land and infrastructure exceeded $168.5 million before arena construction, around 4.8% of a $3.5 billion investment. A recent Tempe deal at roughly $1.22 million per acre would put 60 acres at about $73 million. Phoenix can find affordable land. Finding serviced land in the right part of the Valley is harder.
The difference across the 4 markets is huge. Houston’s site choice can move roughly $200 million of capital. Austin’s can move close to $900 million. Phoenix can spend more preparing cheap land than buying it. Atlanta can use an NHL franchise to lift property values well beyond the arena footprint.
What These Markets Already Spend on Sports
Population and income show how much spending power exists. Existing teams show how much of it sport has managed to capture. Gate receipts and local event revenue are especially useful here, since total franchise revenue also includes national media money and league distributions.
Houston sets the strongest indoor benchmark. The Rockets generated $467 million of revenue, $191 million of operating income and $105 million of gate receipts in 2024 to 2025 from 716,853 regular season spectators, equal to roughly $146 per attendee and $2.56 million per home game. An NHL team drawing 17,500 fans across 42 games would sell 735,000 tickets, only 2.5% more annual admissions than the Rockets. At Houston’s existing $146 indoor gate yield, an NHL club would generate approximately $108 million of annual gate receipts before concessions, merchandise, sponsorship or media.
The wider Houston market has plenty of spending proof as well. The Astros generate another $185 million of gate receipts, while the Texans, Rockets and Astros combine for roughly $389 million. Friedkin would be entering a market capable of supporting premium sport at scale, while still needing to find another $80 million to $110 million of annual gate demand beside 3 deeply established properties.
Austin has no NBA comparison, so Texas football gives the strongest commercial benchmark. The programme generated $181.1 million of FY2025 revenue against $73.9 million of expenses, leaving a $107.2 million surplus. Ticket sales contributed $62.8 million, contributions another $59.5 million, and sponsorship, advertising, licensing and royalties $33.5 million. Austin FC adds $94 million of annual revenue and an $855 million valuation, while the Texas Stars draw more than 6,000 fans per game and recorded 13 sellouts. Central Texas clearly spends on sport and repeatedly pays for hockey. The open question is whether the market can stretch to 735,000 NHL admissions at much higher prices while supporting another major arena.
Atlanta’s strength sits in how much money its sports properties can pull from each customer. Atlanta Braves Holdings generated $357.8 million of baseball event revenue in 2025 from tickets, concessions, sponsorships, suites and premium seating. Revenue increased by $9.9 million even as attendance fell. The mixed use business added $97.4 million of revenue and $68.5 million of Adjusted OIBDA, producing more operating profit than the baseball segment.
The Hawks give Atlanta the direct indoor comparison. They generated $69 million of gate receipts from 657,613 spectators, around $105 per attendee. Apply the same yield to 735,000 NHL admissions and Atlanta reaches roughly $77 million of annual gate receipts. The Braves add another layer to the case: premium inventory, sponsorship and surrounding property can keep lifting revenue even without higher attendance.
Phoenix makes the old Coyotes economics look increasingly irrelevant. The Suns generated $455 million of revenue and $75 million of gate receipts from 699,911 spectators, around $107 per attendee and $1.83 million per home game. At 735,000 NHL admissions, the same yield produces roughly $79 million of annual gate receipts.
Phoenix also gets more local NBA revenue from each resident than Houston or Atlanta. Forbes estimates $45 per metro resident for the Suns, compared with $33 for the Hawks and $32 for the Rockets, despite Phoenix having the smallest metro of the 3. The Coyotes generated only about $120 million of revenue in 2022 to 2023. The Suns now produce 3.8 times as much in the same metropolitan economy. Arena quality, location, premium inventory, media reach and organisational stability created a huge gap. Phoenix did not fail to monetise major sports. The Coyotes failed to monetise Phoenix.
Put the three comparable indoor markets on the same 735,000 admission NHL season and Houston produces roughly $108 million of gate receipts, Phoenix $79 million and Atlanta $77 million. Austin has no equivalent indoor property, though its $181.1 million Texas football business, $62.8 million of football ticket sales, $94 million MLS club and established AHL customer base provide strong evidence from other formats.
Can the Market Support $50M+ in Sponsorship?
An average NHL team now brings in about $53.1 million a year from sponsorship across roughly 99 commercial relationships. League wide sponsorship reached an estimated $1.7 billion in 2025 to 2026, spread across 3,162 deals and more than 2,200 brands. Average deal value rose 11.4% to $529,000 even as deal volume stayed broadly flat. Financial services alone contributes more than $250 million across the league, followed by automotive, beverage alcohol, healthcare, construction and industrial, and technology.
The biggest assets only cover part of the target. The average primary NHL jersey patch is worth around $4.4 million, while ordinary team cosponsors still account for 49% of sponsorship rights value. A new franchise still needs a long list of banks, hospitals, automakers, technology groups, industrial businesses, telecom companies and consumer brands underneath the headline deals.
Houston has the deepest pool. NRG’s stadium agreement carries roughly $10 million of annual advertising payments through 2032, while Daikin, Toyota and Memorial Hermann hold major venue or training rights elsewhere in the city. The Texans alone work with roughly 90 commercial brands, close to the 99 relationships carried by an average NHL team. Houston also has several credible buyers across energy, banking, healthcare, technology, automotive, industrial services and telecom. The market is crowded, but there are enough companies behind the first choice in each category for a new NHL team to keep selling.
Austin has more open space, although the jump to NHL scale is much bigger. Austin FC launched with 6 founding partners and ranked 2nd in MLS sponsorship sales during its first season. Q2, YETI, St. David’s, AMD, Chevron, NI and Lexus have all bought major inventory, while Texas Athletics sells heavily across banking, technology, healthcare, telecom and beverages. MLS clubs averaged about $23.9 million of sponsorship revenue in 2025. The NHL average is $53.1 million, more than 2.2 times higher.
The next layer in Austin sits across technology, semiconductors, cloud, cybersecurity and advanced manufacturing. Samsung’s Austin and Taylor footprint generated $10.9 billion of regional economic impact in 2025 and supports almost 29,000 jobs. There are plenty of companies a hockey team could approach. The open question is how many will spend enough to build a $50 million plus annual sponsorship book.
Atlanta has the strongest record of companies paying heavily for sports inventory. Its 3 major venue naming agreements represent roughly $735 million of nominal commitments, while Mercedes Benz Stadium alone has 17 founding partners. Financial services, automotive, healthcare, beverages, technology and infrastructure are crowded, but many of Atlanta’s biggest companies buy across several properties. Delta, Georgia Power and Global Payments are good examples, while Paze became the Hawks’ jersey patch partner in 2025 despite a packed financial services category.
North Atlanta gives the sales team another pool through Alpharetta’s technology, payments, cybersecurity, data centre, healthcare and professional services economy. The issue is how much extra budget remains after the Falcons, Braves, Hawks, Atlanta United and major college properties have sold into the same market.
Phoenix has changed the most. The Suns say they have more 7 figure business partners than any other NBA team. Their 2025 China Games programme included 57 corporate partners and more than 100 prospective clients. The arena naming agreement carries a headline value of almost $115 million over 10 years, although Mat Ishbia’s related party involvement makes it a weaker measure of open market pricing. TSMC, Intel, Amkor and their suppliers also add new sponsorship categories across semiconductors, automation, construction, logistics, power infrastructure and advanced manufacturing which barely existed through much of the Coyotes era.
Utah is a useful comparison. The franchise inherited the Coyotes’ operation in April 2024, launched with only 11,131 full view seats and had around 6 months to build the commercial business. By the end of its first season, every full view seat was sold and the team ranked among the NHL’s top 15 in sponsorship revenue. The roster barely changed. The commercial environment did.
The hurdle across all 4 cities is roughly 100 commercial relationships producing more than $50 million every year. Houston has the deepest buyer pool. Atlanta has the strongest record of premium corporate spending, with more competition for the same categories. Phoenix has the fastest improving sponsorship market and the clearest evidence that the Coyotes undersold the market. Austin has the most interesting new economy prospect base, but the largest jump from current sponsorship scale to the NHL.
The Value of 42 Home Games
An expansion team would get 42 regular season home games under the NHL’s 84 game schedule. At 17,500 fans per game, the arena would handle 735,000 admissions a year before preseason or playoffs. The calendar matters just as much as the volume. Dallas’ 2026 to 2027 schedule has 26 of 42 home games, or 62%, from Monday through Thursday. At 17,500 attendance, that works out to roughly 455,000 weekday visits, compared with 280,000 from Friday through Sunday. For a mixed use district, hockey brings people into restaurants, bars, parking and hospitality on nights when traffic is usually much harder to create.
Houston would gain 42 major sports dates immediately, but the rest of the calendar would be competitive. Toyota Center generated approximately $56.5 million of live event box office gross in 2025, while NRG Stadium produced another $71.6 million. A Friedkin arena would control 735,000 NHL admissions, potentially including around 455,000 weekday visits, while concerts and touring shows would still be competing for the same Houston audience. The real value comes from having a guaranteed winter calendar capable of feeding a surrounding district every year.
Austin has the hardest test. The Texas Stars play 28 of their 36 home games, nearly 78%, from Friday through Sunday, so much of their current hockey demand benefits from weekend scheduling. An NHL team could need 17,500 people for 25 plus weekday games at far higher prices. Moody Center is also performing at an exceptional level, with more than 3.5 million fans across 600 plus events and 200 sellouts since 2022, more than 150 events a year and over $126 million of event gross in a recent year. Forty two NHL games alone would equal 28% of Moody Center’s stated annual event count. Hockey fills the new arena calendar, but concerts, family shows and touring events would still be competing with one of America’s strongest venues.
Atlanta has more room because the proposed arena sits in a different part of the metro. State Farm Arena drew 598,000 spectators across 46 major entertainment events in the first half of 2025 and finished the year 5th in the US and 7th globally in Billboard’s large arena rankings. North Point or South Forsyth would sit closer to affluent northern suburbs instead of relying on the downtown audience. A full NHL season at 17,500 produces 735,000 admissions, more than the 598,000 spectators State Farm Arena drew across those 46 cited events. Hockey alone gives a northern district a large recurring customer base before the first concert is booked.
Phoenix also gets a strong hockey calendar, but arena supply is heavy. Mortgage Matchup Center hosts approximately 175 to 200 ticketed events a year and attracts more than 2 million visitors. A Scottsdale, Tempe or East Valley arena would add 42 guaranteed winter games closer to the customers the Coyotes struggled to reach from Glendale, during the busiest period of Arizona’s visitor season. Hockey fits Phoenix extremely well. Filling the rest of the building becomes harder when the downtown arena is already running close to 200 ticketed events a year.
The picture is fairly simple. Atlanta gets the most value from creating 42 major dates in a new northern entertainment district. Houston has enough scale to absorb another 42 games, even with a crowded concert market. Phoenix gets hockey during the strongest months of its tourism economy. Austin faces the toughest arena case because Moody Center is already using the same entertainment market extremely well.
The number worth remembering is 455,000 weekday visits under a Dallas style schedule. A few huge Saturday concerts help. Hundreds of thousands of people arriving on ordinary Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday and Thursday nights can reshape the economics of an entire district.
Follow the Money
A new NHL team can make money far beyond the franchise P&L. Tickets, suites, concessions, parking, naming rights, concerts, hotels and nearby real estate can all sit under different owners. With a $2 billion franchise fee, the structure matters enormously. If the team drives the traffic but the arena operator, promoter, public authority or developer keeps too much of the upside, the owner can build a successful district and still end up with a weak return.
Houston offers the cleanest template. Toyota Center is owned by the Harris County Houston Sports Authority, yet the Rockets control most of the commercial rights through their lease, including seat income, naming rights, advertising, broadcasting, concessions and beverage rights. The building is public, but much of the money made inside it flows to the team. Friedkin would want a similar setup for a permanent NHL arena. Toyota Center can work as a temporary home, although the Rockets’ lease runs through 2033 to 2034 and the commercial structure is built around them. The best Houston outcome is one where the franchise, arena business and surrounding development economics sit inside the same Friedkin platform.
Austin is much more fragmented. UT owns Moody Center and the land, while Oak View Group supplied capital and operates the venue under a 35 year agreement. Texas controls roughly 60 university dates and keeps ticketing, parking, concessions and merchandise revenue from them. OVG controls most concert economics. UT receives 20% of suite revenue across all events and begins sharing concert revenue 50/50 after 10 years. Friedkin could own a second Austin arena and still make less from it if OVG, Live Nation, C3 Presents and Moody Center continue controlling much of the profitable non hockey calendar.
Atlanta has 2 very different setups. At North Point, New York Life owns the mall, Jamestown leads the redevelopment and the future NHL owner is still unknown. Alpharetta has approved 1,385 apartments, 650 hotel rooms, 750,000 square feet of offices and extensive commercial development, with key occupancy rights linked to securing an NHL franchise by August 24, 2031. Hockey is the trigger for the wider project. Any owner paying $2 billion for the team would want development equity, arena operating rights, land participation or profit sharing. Without enough of those rights, the franchise could spend billions creating value for hotels, apartments, offices and retail owned by someone else.
South Forsyth is easier to understand. The county would contribute $225 million toward the arena if the NHL awards the franchise, while the private side finances the mixed use development and keeps much of the operating economics. The public money is repaid through property taxes, hotel taxes, arena rent and a $2.50 ticket surcharge. At 17,500 fans across 42 games, the surcharge alone produces roughly $1.84 million per regular season before playoffs or concerts. The $225 million reduces the private capital burden, but part of the future cash flow goes back to the public side.
Phoenix is still too early to model properly. The market is looking for a credible control owner, arena site and development plan. Bill Daly has confirmed talks with interested groups, but no public deal currently links the team, land, arena operator, financing and surrounding property. For now, there is no value capture structure to underwrite.
The gap across the markets is wide. Houston gives Friedkin the clearest path to controlling the franchise, arena economics and development upside together. South Forsyth has the most developed public and private sharing structure. North Point carries the biggest risk of an NHL owner creating property value for other investors. Austin could give Friedkin full ownership of a new arena while leaving much of the event economics elsewhere. Phoenix has no completed structure yet.
For the investor, owning, controlling, creating and capturing value are 4 different things. At $2 billion just to enter the league, the worst structure is one where the team creates billions of dollars of activity and too much of the return ends up somewhere else.
How Strong Is the Existing Hockey Customer?
Surveys can measure interest. Ticket sales show who has actually paid for hockey. Across these 4 markets, the evidence comes from the NHL, AHL, ECHL and NCAA, so prices and products vary, but the history still shows how often people came back, how much arena location affected demand and whether hockey survived after teams struggled or disappeared.
Austin has the strongest current minor league record. The Texas Stars averaged more than 6,000 fans across 36 home games in 2024 to 2025 in a 6,778 seat arena, filling at least 88.5% of capacity and selling out 13 games. By March 2026, another 9 sellouts had followed. The club enters its 18th AHL season in 2026 to 2027, giving Central Texas almost 2 decades of regular professional hockey. The jump to the NHL is still large. A 6,000 average produces roughly 216,000 annual admissions; an NHL team drawing 17,500 across 42 games needs 735,000, more than 3.4 times as many, at much higher prices.
Houston’s evidence is older, though the Aeros were drawing well when they left. Attendance averaged 5,982 in 2008 to 2009, 5,770 in 2009 to 2010, 6,326 in 2010 to 2011 and 7,324 in 2011 to 2012, ranking between 5th and 9th in the AHL. The final 2012 to 2013 season finished at 6,793 per game, 7th among 30 clubs. Toyota Center lease negotiations reportedly involved a 550% rent increase, while arena operators preferred more profitable concert dates. After the move, the Iowa Wild drew 13% less in their first season than Houston had in its final year. Houston lost hockey with a top 8 AHL gate. The weakness now is simply time: the city’s paid hockey market has not been properly tested for 13 years.
Atlanta has seen the widest swing. The Thrashers averaged 17,206 in their inaugural season, drew more than 16,000during their only division title and playoff season in 2006 to 2007, then fell to 13,469 by 2010 to 2011 after years of poor results and ownership instability. The current product is much smaller, though sales are moving in the right direction. The Gladiators drew 171,354 fans across 36 games in 2025 to 2026, averaging 4,759. Attendance rose 13%, ticket revenue 26%, total ticket holders 15%, and season ticket accounts increased by 871. Ten games topped 6,000 and the largest crowd reached 8,267.
There is still work to do in Atlanta. The ECHL averaged 5,018 fans, leaving the Gladiators about 5% below league average, while 44,477 group tickets accounted for roughly 26% of total attendance. Hockey has a paying audience and the business is growing, though a new NHL club would have to build a much larger customer base from the ground up.
Phoenix gives the best recent test of how much arena location can change the same NHL product. The Coyotes’ average ticket was around $90 in Glendale and about $170 at Mullett Arena in Tempe, an 89% increase. Season ticket plan revenue rose 50% above anything generated in Glendale, and all 20 suites sold. Mullett held only around 4,600 to 5,000 NHL spectators, so scarcity clearly helped push pricing higher and the $170 figure cannot simply be carried into a future 17,500 seat arena. Even with the capacity effect, customers paid far more once hockey moved closer to the East Valley.
The hockey habit also survived after the Coyotes left. Arizona State averaged 4,406 at Mullett in 2022 to 2023, 4,798 in 2023 to 2024, 5,074 in 2024 to 2025 and 4,973 in 2025 to 2026. The latest season produced 99,459 admissions and ranked 11th nationally in NCAA hockey. USA Hockey counted 9,534 registered Arizona players in 2024 to 2025, up from 8,983 in 2018 to 2019. The NHL team disappeared, but people kept buying and playing hockey.
Phoenix has the strongest recent proof of customers paying NHL prices. Austin has the strongest current professional hockey habit outside the league, with annual attendance needing to grow from roughly 216,000 to 735,000. Houston had a strong AHL business when hockey left, though the evidence is 13 years old. Atlanta has supported NHL crowds above 16,000 before and has a growing hockey business today, but the paying audience still needs rebuilding.
The useful question for expansion is simple: how often have people paid for hockey, how much were they willing to spend, and did the demand survive poor teams, arena moves and franchise loss?
Who Pays for the Arena?
The NHL’s Texas framework points to roughly $3.5 billion of total investment: a $2 billion expansion fee and about $1.5 billion for the arena and associated development. The funding mix can change the return quite quickly. Every $100 million supplied by a public authority or outside investor lowers the owner’s annual return burden by $7 million at a 7% hurdle, $10 million at 10% and $12 million at 12%. A $300 million contribution cuts the annual hurdle by $21 million to $36 million. At $500 million, the saving reaches $35 million to $60 million.
Houston has the deepest public financing base. The Harris County Houston Sports Authority expects $41.8 million of hotel occupancy tax revenue and $34.45 million of rental car tax revenue in 2026, giving it $76.25 million of recurring dedicated tax receipts. Rent and royalty income adds another $21.91 million, taking total budgeted receipts to roughly $129.68 million, although much of the money is committed to existing obligations.
The city also has a long history of using this structure for major league venues. Toyota Center’s core project budget was about $202 million, with $182 million financed through Sports Authority bonds. Daikin Park and NRG Stadium also received substantial public financing. A new NHL arena changes the scale completely. At $1.5 billion, the building would cost more than 6 times Toyota Center’s original construction cost. Another $182 million contribution would cover only about 12%, while $300 million would cover 20%.
The debt burden rises quickly as well. At an illustrative 30 year term and 6% financing cost, $300 million would require about $21.8 million of annual debt service, $500 million $36.3 million and $750 million $54.5 million. Those payments equal roughly 29%, 48% and 71% of HCHSA’s current hotel and rental car tax receipts before existing debt is included. Houston has the issuer, dedicated taxes, financing history and active discussions with Friedkin. The key unknown is how much of the $1.5 billion arena HCHSA can realistically fund.
Austin has taken a different route. Moody Center cost approximately $375 million and was financed privately through Oak View Group and its partners on University of Texas land under a 35 year commercial agreement. UT contributed land and infrastructure, while private capital received long term operating rights. In December 2025, UT used a similar structure in its RFP for another roughly 6,000 seat arena, asking private developers to fund all or a substantial share of construction without university credit.
For Friedkin, a mostly private arena carries a much heavier burden. Funding nearly all of a $1.5 billion arena creates an annual economic return hurdle of $105 million at 7%, $150 million at 10% and $180 million at 12%. Bring in $300 million of outside capital and the 10% hurdle falls from $150 million to $120 million a year. Austin has proved private capital will finance an arena when the commercial rights are strong enough. No public NHL package has been disclosed, and a second building would still compete with the Moody Center business which made the first model work.
Atlanta has the only proposal with a firm public contribution tied directly to an NHL award. Forsyth County has committed $225 million toward South Forsyth’s proposed roughly $1 billion arena, equal to about 22.5% of arena value, if the project secures a franchise. Replacing $225 million of private capital lowers the owner’s annual return requirement by roughly $15.8 million at 7%, $22.5 million at 10% and $27 million at 12%. Voters approved the TAD powers 56% to 44% in 2024, and the county and school authorities completed the development agreements in 2025.
North Point is less developed financially. Alpharetta has created a 646 acre TAD covering around 150 parcels with a taxable digest near $264.7 million, giving the project a way to fund infrastructure as property values rise. No comparable arena contribution has been announced. South Forsyth has a defined public commitment. North Point has a financing tool, but no disclosed amount.
Phoenix has the weakest capital stack today. No control owner, arena site, construction budget or financing structure has been publicly assembled. The failed Tempe Entertainment District was a $2.1 billion project with at least $1.9 billion expected from private capital, yet voters still rejected the enabling measures. The later north Phoenix proposal was also presented as privately financed while requiring substantial owner funded infrastructure. Until a new plan shows a different structure, a future Phoenix owner has to assume most of the arena cost will sit with private capital.
South Forsyth has the strongest confirmed public contribution. Houston has the deepest financing capacity and longest major league track record, although the eventual amount remains unknown. Austin has the strongest private financing precedent and could leave Friedkin carrying the largest arena burden. North Point has a useful financing mechanism without a disclosed contribution. Phoenix has no capital structure to underwrite yet.
Moving $300 million to $500 million away from the owner can lower the annual return burden by tens of millions of dollars before the first game is played.
The Fight Is for Attention, Not Just Fans
A new NHL team needs 42 home dates and 735,000 annual admissions, plus sponsor attention, media consumption and a regular place in the household entertainment budget. Every candidate can produce sports fans. The real question is how much extra behaviour hockey has to create on top of what each market is buying now.
Houston’s Astros, Rockets, Texans and Dynamo generate roughly 4.38 million regular season admissions. Atlanta’s Braves, Hawks, Falcons, Atlanta United and Dream generate about 4.97 million. Phoenix’s Diamondbacks, Suns, Cardinals and Mercury produce roughly 3.85 million, before spring training. Austin FC, Texas football, basketball, baseball, volleyball and the Texas Stars collectively generate at least 1.83 million, excluding Formula 1, other COTA events and Moody Center concerts. Add 735,000 NHL visits and the increase comes to roughly 15% in Atlanta, 17% in Houston, 19% in Phoenix and 40% against Austin’s selected recurring sports base.
Atlanta has the easiest volume to absorb. Atlanta United alone drew 747,859 spectators across 17 home games in 2025, almost the same annual attendance an NHL team would need. Sports Business Journal also ranked Atlanta No. 1 among US sports business cities in 2026, reflecting the depth of its teams, events, sponsorship market and infrastructure. Hockey would still have to earn attention alongside the Braves, Falcons, Hawks, Atlanta United, major college football events, US Soccer and an incoming NWSL franchise. North Point and South Forsyth give the club a way to build more of its identity around North Atlanta instead of joining the same downtown sports conversation.
Houston has more room to absorb another major property. Adding 735,000 NHL visits to 4.38 million existing major pro admissions increases the total by about 17% inside a metro of 7.9 million people. Friedkin does not need hockey to become Houston’s biggest team. He needs enough households and companies willing to make it another serious commitment beside the Texans, Astros and Rockets.
Austin faces the biggest attendance build. Austin FC sold 352,546 tickets in 2025, Texas men’s basketball drew 194,228, women’s basketball 133,214, baseball 250,757, volleyball 67,149 and the Texas Stars at least 216,000. Texas football added roughly 614,200 spectators across only 6 true Austin home games, more than 102,000 per game.
An NHL club would still need about 121,000 more annual admissions than Texas football generates in Austin, largely because hockey has 7 times as many home dates. Across the selected Austin properties, another 735,000 visits increases recurring sports attendance by roughly 40%. Austin gives hockey more room to become part of the city’s identity, while asking consumers to create far more new ticket buying than any other candidate.
Phoenix becomes a different market once spring training enters the picture. Its core teams generate about 3.85 million regular season admissions, putting the NHL increase at roughly 19%. The Cactus League added another 1.70 million admissions across 224 games in 2025, taking selected sports volume above 5.5 million. On the broader base, an NHL team adds only about 13%.
Phoenix clearly consumes sport at scale, although much of the spending lands in winter and early spring. The Suns, Cactus League, WM Phoenix Open, college events and hockey would all compete during Arizona’s strongest tourism and hospitality months. Phoenix also has a larger outside customer pool: roughly 6 in 10 Cactus League spectators come from outside Arizona, giving a hockey team access to snowbirds, Canadians and travelling fans alongside local buyers.
The picture is fairly clear. Atlanta has the best proof that another major property can be absorbed. Houston has the largest cushion for adding another serious sports commitment. Phoenix has the deepest winter sports behaviour. Austin gives hockey the most room to become culturally important, but requires the largest proportional increase in recurring attendance.
The real hurdle is 735,000 additional paid visits every year. Fewer teams give hockey more room to become important. A busier sports market gives the NHL more proof that people will keep buying tickets anyway.
How Much More Can Fans and Sponsors Spend?
Austin has the best affordability profile. Using Seattle’s estimated $132 average NHL ticket, 2 tickets across all 42 home games cost $11,088 before parking, food, merchandise or playoffs. That works out to roughly 13.6% of median gross household income in Houston, 12.3% in Phoenix, 12.0% in Atlanta and 11.1% in Austin. Austin households have the most room, on income, to take on NHL pricing.
Austin also has a much smaller major sports economy today. Austin FC generates about $94 million of revenue, while University of Texas athletics produced $352.5 million in fiscal 2025, putting the 2 at roughly $447 million combinedbefore Formula 1, COTA, the Texas Stars and other properties. Houston’s Texans, Rockets, Astros and Dynamo generate about $1.69 billion combined. Atlanta’s Falcons, Hawks, Braves and United generate about $1.72 billion, while Phoenix’s Cardinals, Suns and Diamondbacks produce roughly $1.35 billion. These figures include national media and league distributions, so they show overall sports business scale, not purely local fan spending.
Austin’s appeal comes from having affluent households with fewer major league properties competing for their money. Houston has a much larger sports economy, but the Texans, Rockets, Astros and Dynamo already command significant household and corporate spend. Atlanta is even more crowded, with the largest incumbent sports economy of the 4. Phoenix also supports a substantial sports market, while the Coyotes’ departure leaves some local hockey spending without an NHL team.
The corporate wallet looks similar. Houston has the deepest pool of potential buyers. Atlanta has exceptional sponsor density, but more teams and properties chasing the same budgets. Austin has fewer large companies, though technology gives it more open space. Phoenix is adding semiconductor and advanced manufacturing investment on a scale barely present during much of the Coyotes era, with CBRE estimating more than $200 billion of current facility investmentacross the region.
For a $3.5 billion investment, Austin offers the best affordability and the most room in the consumer market. Houston offers the largest pool of money from which to build the business. At this price, having more dollars available matters more than simply having fewer teams competing for them.
The Arena Can Create or Destroy the Investment
Friedkin is effectively buying 2 assets: a $2 billion NHL franchise and an arena plus development package which could absorb another $1.5 billion. At 17,500 seats, the arena works out to roughly $86,000 of capital per hockey seat. T Mobile Arena cost about $375 million for 17,500 hockey seats, or $21,400 per seat. Climate Pledge Arena cost $1.15 billion for 17,100 seats, around $67,300 per seat. Intuit Dome went above $2 billion for 18,000 seats, more than $111,000 per seat. On cost, the implied Texas project sits much closer to Intuit Dome than to the arena Vegas opened with.
Capacity has barely moved. Modern arenas still hold roughly 17,000 to 20,000 people. A $1.5 billion building has to earn much more from each fan and from the space around them through premium clubs, suites, sponsorship inventory, concessions, naming rights, concerts, customer data and surrounding development. Forty two hockey games alone will never carry the economics.
Houston would open beside a much stronger Toyota Center. The arena is going through a $180 million transformation covering premium areas, hospitality, retail and concert upgrades, funded by $95 million from the state and $85 million from Tilman Fertitta. Friedkin would be chasing many of the same premium customers and touring shows. Toyota Center also faces more than $635 million of estimated maintenance over the next 20 years, close to $32 million a year if spread evenly. The first construction cheque is only part of the cost. Premium areas, technology, suites and building systems keep absorbing capital for decades.
Austin has the biggest risk of spending heavily for limited extra capacity. Moody Center cost about $375 million and holds roughly 15,000 for basketball, around $25,000 of original construction capital per seat. A $1.5 billion NHL arena with 17,500 seats would carry roughly 3.4 times as much nominal capital per seat while adding only a few thousand seats. Friedkin would need the second building to earn far more from each customer while competing with an arena performing extremely well in concerts and premium entertainment.
Atlanta has the strongest property story around the arena. South Forsyth plans a $1 billion arena inside a roughly $3 billion mixed use development. At approximately 18,500 seats, the arena comes to about $54,000 per seat. Around 2 thirds of the overall development capital sits in hotels, residential, retail, office and other property capable of producing income during the 323 regular season days without NHL hockey.
North Point goes even further. The nearly 99 acre plan includes a 20,000 seat arena, 1,385 apartments, 750,000 square feet of office space, 650 hotel rooms and 565,000 square feet of commercial space. No arena budget has been disclosed, leaving a detailed physical plan without enough financial information to judge the return.
Dallas gives a useful comparison. The Stars are worth around $2.3 billion and generate roughly $250 million of annual revenue, yet they are pursuing an approximately $1 billion hockey centred arena and district in Plano while operating successfully today. A new arena can still make sense for a healthy franchise when ownership also gains another source of property income and long term franchise value.
Phoenix has experienced both ways an arena can go wrong. Footprint Center received a $245 million renovation and became a much stronger NBA and entertainment venue, yet the NHL still considers it unsuitable for hockey. Mullett Arena fixed much of the location problem, but its roughly 4,500 seats left too little inventory and cost Coyotes ownership tens of millions of dollars. One building had the scale but not the hockey fit. The other had a better location but too little capacity.
The 4 markets separate quickly. Atlanta has the strongest opportunity to use hockey to support a much larger development. Houston has good reason to build a dedicated hockey arena, but Toyota Center is becoming a tougher competitor. Austin carries the highest risk of putting too much capital into a second arena. Phoenix has lived through the cost of getting both location and building economics wrong.
At current construction prices, the arena can consume almost as much capital as the franchise fee. A badly conceived $1.5 billion building can sit on the balance sheet for 30 years.
How Much Revenue Can Tourism Add?
Tourism becomes useful only when visitors buy seats. Under the NHL’s 84 game schedule, every club hosts all 31 opponents at least once each season, giving a new franchise access to every major travelling fan base. Vegas built this into its model, reserving roughly 10% to 15% of ticket inventory for visitors while keeping most seats for locals.
At 17,500 fans across 42 games, a 5% visitor share means 36,750 annual admissions, 10% means 73,500, 15% means 110,250 and 20% means 147,000. Using the report’s $105 ticket and $25 food and beverage assumption gives $130 of franchise captured revenue per visiting fan. Annual revenue reaches roughly $4.8 million at 5%, $9.6 million at 10%, $14.3 million at 15% and $19.1 million at 20%. Every extra 1 percentage point adds about $956,000 a year before merchandise, parking, premium upgrades or spending around the arena.
The required conversion is tiny beside each tourism market. Houston welcomed 52.3 million visitors in 2025, Atlanta about 52 million, Phoenix 47.7 million and Austin 30.1 million domestic visitors. Filling 10% of NHL seats with visitors would require only 0.14% of Houston or Atlanta visitors, 0.15% of Phoenix visitors and 0.24% of Austin visitors. What changes from city to city is the type of visitor, when they travel and how naturally hockey fits into the trip.
Houston has enormous volume, but less sports led travel than Phoenix or Atlanta. Of its 52.3 million visitors, 22.9 million stayed overnight, so a 10% NHL visitor share would require only around 0.32% of overnight trips. Houston Airports serve 200 plus nonstop destinations, processed 62 million passengers in 2025 and handled a record 12.4 million international passengers through Bush Intercontinental. The 2026 World Cup also showed Houston can handle travelling supporters at scale, with more than 480,000 match tickets sold and roughly 44% reportedly bought by international visitors. For hockey, the more realistic pool is business travellers, convention traffic, regional drive markets and visiting fans adding a game to an existing trip. Tourism can support Houston, but locals still need to fill most of the building.
Atlanta has stronger proof of people travelling specifically for sport. Its roughly 52 million visitors spent $21 billion in 2025, supported by one of the world’s largest air networks. The 2026 College Football Playoff semifinal generated an estimated $63.2 million of economic impact and $4.64 million of direct tax revenue from 75,604 spectators, with research finding substantial spending from visitors who travelled for the game. A northern arena surrounded by hotels and restaurants could tap into similar behaviour throughout the season. Atlanta has a credible case for the middle or upper end of the 10% to 15% visitor range, especially for marquee opponents.
Phoenix has the strongest tourism fit. The market welcomed 47.7 million visitors in 2025, generating more than $13.4 billion of direct spending. Visitors stayed an average of 3.1 nights and travelled in parties of 2.7 people. A 2026 city study found 24% of Footprint Center visitors came from elsewhere in the US and another 1% were international, giving Phoenix direct evidence of an indoor arena pulling meaningful demand from outside the market.
Canada strengthens the case further. Arizona welcomed about 664,000 Canadian visitors in 2025. Its detailed 2024 visitor profile showed average stays of 6 nights, household income around $107,525, and 87% leisure travel. Phoenix and Central Arizona captured 75% of Canadian Visa travel spending, while 73% of measured Canadian card spending came in Q1 and Q4, almost perfectly matching the NHL calendar. Direct flights connect Phoenix with Calgary, Edmonton, Montreal, Toronto, Vancouver and Winnipeg. Of the 4 candidates, Phoenix gives the strongest case for underwriting a 15% visitor share.
Austin has enough tourism, but much less proof of recurring hockey travel. Formula 1 shows the city can attract major sports tourism, although 1 global weekend says little about 42 NHL dates. The better opportunity is regional. Houston, Dallas Fort Worth and San Antonio provide large drive markets, while marquee opponents can support destination weekends. Austin’s visitor economy can lift selected games, but there is less evidence of visitors filling NHL seats throughout the season.
Phoenix has the strongest visitor revenue case. Atlanta has the best sports travel evidence after Phoenix. Houston has the largest tourism pool, but a lower natural hockey conversion rate. Austin has the weakest evidence of recurring NHL style visitor demand.
Moving from 5% to 15% visitor attendance adds roughly $9.6 million of annual franchise revenue using the conservative $130 basket, or almost $100 million across 10 mature seasons before price growth, playoffs or spending around the district. Tourism will not carry a weak franchise, but in Phoenix and Atlanta it can make a meaningful difference across 42 home games.
How Much Revenue Do Visiting Fans Really Add?
A visiting fan does not automatically mean new money. If every candidate averages 17,500 paid spectators across 42 games, each team still sells 735,000 admissions. A tourist may simply buy a seat a local would have taken. Using the same $130 franchise captured basket, made up of a $105 ticket and $25 of food and beverage, the visitor numbers show where game day revenue comes from. The extra value appears when tourists fill otherwise empty seats or pay a higher price.
Under the report’s visitor assumptions, Houston brings in 44,100 to 73,500 visiting fans a year, worth $5.7 million to $9.6 million of game day revenue. Atlanta reaches 58,800 to 95,550 visitors and $7.6 million to $12.4 million. Phoenix reaches 80,850 to 124,950 visitors and $10.5 million to $16.2 million, while Austin brings in 36,750 to 66,150 and $4.8 million to $8.6 million. At the midpoint, visitors account for roughly $7.6 million in Houston, $10 million in Atlanta, $13.4 million in Phoenix and $6.7 million in Austin. These figures sit inside total game day revenue and should not all be counted as extra income.
The benefit becomes much clearer when local demand falls short. If locals fill only 16,500 seats, another 1,000 visitors per game across 42 games create $5.46 million of genuinely incremental annual revenue at the $130 basket. A 500 seat gap is worth $2.73 million, 1,500 seats $8.19 million and 2,000 seats $10.92 million. At the midpoint assumptions, Phoenix brings in roughly 2,450 outside fans per game, Atlanta 1,838, Houston 1,400 and Austin 1,225. Those buyers become especially useful during losing seasons or once the first few years of expansion excitement wear off.
Vegas gives a good picture of how this can develop. Visiting fans made up roughly 10% to 30% of crowds depending on the opponent during the inaugural season, falling to around 2% to 10% by 2022 to 2023 as the local fan base grew. The team became less dependent on tourists, while still benefiting from them for selected games. That is the healthier long term balance: locals carry most nights and visitors step in when extra inventory is available.
Travelling fans can also lift ticket yield. Supporters coming to see Toronto, Montreal, Boston, Chicago or the Rangers are more likely to buy single game tickets than discounted season plans. If a visiting customer pays 20% above the $105 ticket benchmark, the extra $21 produces about $1.54 million of additional annual ticket revenue at a 10% visitor share. At a 30% premium, the gain rises to roughly $2.32 million. Marquee opponents should carry the strongest pricing, and the NHL’s 84 game schedule guarantees every franchise visits once each season.
Phoenix benefits most from this model. At a 14% midpoint visitor share, roughly 102,900 of 735,000 annual admissions come from outside the local market. Atlanta follows with 77,175, Houston with 58,800 and Austin with 51,450. Phoenix gets the largest pool of outside buyers to cover weaker local nights and the most single game customers who may pay higher prices. Atlanta follows through its established sports travel market. Houston gets useful demand from business travellers, conventions and marquee opponents. Austin has the smallest visitor cushion and needs Central Texas residents to carry more of the 42 game calendar.
A high visitor share is only useful when the local base is strong enough underneath it. A team relying on 20% visiting fans because locals cannot fill the building is weaker than one with 5% visitors and a season ticket waiting list.Tourism works best when it lifts prices on strong nights and fills seats when local demand falls away. Phoenix has the strongest case on both.
Who Is Moving Into These Markets?
All 4 markets are growing, but the growth is coming from very different people. Between July 2024 and July 2025, Houston added 126,720 residents, Atlanta 61,953, Phoenix 59,065 and Austin 53,796. Austin grew fastest at roughly 2.1%, followed by Houston at 1.6%, Phoenix at 1.1% and Atlanta at 1.0%. For an NHL owner, the bigger question is who is moving in. Domestic migration brings households with existing incomes and sports habits. International migration and natural increase build a larger pool of future fans over time.
Houston added 71,903 international migrants and 48,002 through natural increase, with only 7,308 from net domestic migration. Atlanta was similar, adding 33,399 international migrants, 25,469 through natural increase and just 3,019 domestic migrants. Phoenix was far more balanced at about 23,290 international and 22,256 domestic migrants. Austin was almost evenly split between 19,860 domestic migrants, 17,457 international migrants and 16,621 through natural increase. Houston and Atlanta are adding people quickly, but very little of the latest growth comes from households relocating from elsewhere in the US.
Houston still adds people at enormous scale. The metro has gained roughly 1.2 million residents over the past decadeand now has almost 2 million foreign born residents, more than 25% of the population. Inside the metro, domestic households are moving outward. Harris County added 48,695 people in 2025 while losing 43,377 residents through net domestic migration. Montgomery gained 22,690 domestic migrants and Fort Bend 10,406. Greater Houston Partnership data also show 41.9% of tax filers leaving Harris remain somewhere else in the Houston metro. Houston keeps growing, but more established households are shifting toward the suburbs, which has a direct bearing on arena location.
Austin’s shift is even clearer. The city added only 4,025 residents in 2025, while Travis County lost 6,590 residents through domestic migration. Williamson County gained 14,764 domestic migrants, around 74% of the metro’s total domestic migration gain. Round Rock added 5,661 residents, Georgetown 5,455, Kyle 3,994 and Hutto 3,362, while Liberty Hill grew 11.7%. A large share of Austin’s future customer growth is moving north, into the same corridor where land is cheaper and a new arena becomes easier to build.
Atlanta’s strongest population story sits in North Atlanta. Only 3,019 of the metro’s 61,953 person gain came from domestic migration, while Fulton County recorded about 3,100 net domestic departures. Forsyth County moved the other way, adding roughly 1,700 domestic migrants, 1,500 international migrants and 886 through natural increase. Its population has grown 12.5% since 2020 to 282,805, with 22.9% foreign born. A northern arena would sit inside one of the parts of Atlanta still adding households while sections of the core lose domestic residents.
Phoenix has the sharpest split between where its premium hockey customer lives today and where new households are arriving. The metro added 59,065 residents and recorded 22,256 net domestic migrants, the highest among America’s 20 largest metros. Maricopa County contributed only 941 of those domestic gains. Pinal County added 21,315, roughly 96% of the metro’s net domestic migration, and has grown 26.6% since 2020 to 539,380 residents. Much of Phoenix’s established premium hockey customer sits around Scottsdale, Tempe and the East Valley, while the newest domestic growth is moving farther southeast.
The IRS data add spending power to the picture. In 2022 to 2023, Phoenix received about $8.4 billion of AGI from incoming domestic tax filers and lost $6.4 billion, leaving a $2.0 billion net gain. Arriving filers averaged roughly $89,000 of AGI versus $78,000 for departures, a 14% premium. Austin gained about $1.4 billion of net domestic AGI, with $7.3 billion arriving and $5.9 billion leaving. Houston produced only about $230 million of net AGI despite far greater migration volume, with arriving filers averaging $79,000 versus $86,000 for departures. Atlanta recorded a $238 million net domestic AGI loss, with $7.9 billion arriving and $8.1 billion leaving. The figures are lagged and exclude international migration, but they show why population growth can look strong while premium spending power moves in a very different direction.
Phoenix also has an interesting hockey angle in where its newcomers come from. Major domestic origin markets included Los Angeles, Chicago, Seattle, Denver, Dallas and New York, with those 6 corridors sending almost 30,000 people to Phoenix in 2022 to 2023. They will not all become NHL customers, but many arrive from cities where hockey is already part of the sports culture.
The 4 markets now look very different. Houston creates the most new customers, with more fan development required and more households moving outward. Austin has the most balanced growth mix and strong incoming purchasing power, with Williamson becoming increasingly important. Atlanta’s best demographic case sits in North Atlanta. Phoenix is importing the most domestic wealth, while much of its newest growth is moving beyond today’s established hockey customer base.
For expansion, metro growth on its own says very little. The more useful question is how many affluent households are arriving, where they are settling and whether the arena can still reach them 20 to 30 years from now.
Media Market
Houston is America’s No. 6 television market, Atlanta No. 7, Phoenix No. 12 and Austin No. 34. Nielsen’s 2024 to 2025 estimates put them at roughly 2.80 million, 2.76 million, 2.20 million and 1.03 million television households. Houston has almost 2.7 times Austin’s local inventory, while Austin still has around 15% more households than Las Vegas, the No. 40 market and home to one of the NHL’s strongest local brands. The ranking gives the NHL a starting point. Reach depends on how widely and easily people can watch.
Austin is the biggest example of how a DMA can undersell a market. San Antonio adds another 1.096 million television households. Together, Austin and San Antonio reach roughly 2.13 million homes, only 3% below Phoenix’s 2.20 million and slightly above Seattle’s 2.10 million. San Antonio would not automatically belong to an Austin franchise, and any wider Central Texas territory would need league approval and an agreement with Dallas. Still, the upside is clear: a 1.03 million household local DMA could eventually become a 2 million plus household regional product.
Texas also has a complication. The Stars already distribute games free across Texas, Oklahoma, Louisiana and Arkansas through a 7 year Victory+ agreement launched in 2024. Victory+ says the first Stars season averaged roughly 110,000 viewers per game. Audiences rose another 43% in 2025 to 2026, with one Colorado game topping 342,000 viewers. The platform passed 500,000 downloads early in the deal and later reached 1 million monthly active users. Houston or Austin would be entering a state where Dallas is already building a free hockey audience, so media territory would likely need to be redrawn before a 2029 to 2030 launch.
Houston has the simplest local media case. Its 2.80 million TV households are larger than the entire Phoenix DMA and roughly 1 third above Seattle. Nielsen classifies 28.8% of Houston households as OTA only, equal to about 806,000 homes on a directional basis. Friedkin could use free over the air television and broad streaming to build the audience without leaning on a traditional RSN. Seattle offers a useful benchmark. Kraken Hockey Network reaches more than 4 million households, almost twice the size of Seattle’s local DMA, and tripled viewership in its first season after leaving ROOT Sports. Vegas local ratings more than doubled after moving to free OTA distribution.
Phoenix has the strongest working version of this model. The Suns moved away from the RSN system and now reach nearly 3 million Arizona television homes, roughly 36% more than the Phoenix DMA. Suns broadcasts averaged more than 110,000 viewers per game in 2025 to 2026, placing them among the NBA’s top 4 local household audiences. Mercury viewership has risen almost 500% since the move to free television. Around 24.6% of Phoenix households are OTA only, roughly 541,000 homes on the Nielsen base. A returning NHL team could use a proven statewide distribution model instead of rebuilding the Coyotes’ old setup.
Atlanta has enough local scale without relying on a wider regional footprint. Its 2.76 million television households are almost identical to Houston and roughly 31% above Seattle. Hawks broadcasts averaged more than 47,000 viewers through their first 23 regional games in 2025 to 2026, up 19%, while streaming users increased 142%. Atlanta also sits in the middle of a Southeast region without an NHL franchise in Georgia, Alabama or Mississippi. Any wider regional audience would be a bonus. The No. 7 DMA is large enough on its own.
The timing also gives expansion some national media value. The NHL’s current US agreements with ESPN and Turner are worth approximately $625 million a year and expire after 2027 to 2028, with formal negotiating windows beginning in 2027. If Texas expansion is approved before those talks, broadcasters would know another US franchise is expected around 2029 to 2030. Houston is easier to sell in that conversation because it adds a top 6 US television market. Austin needs Central Texas and digital distribution to turn a No. 34 DMA into a much larger regional audience.
Houston has the strongest immediate media value. Phoenix has the best working distribution model. Atlanta offers almost Houston sized local scale with Southeast upside. Austin has the weakest DMA, but the ranking hides a much larger Central Texas opportunity if San Antonio becomes part of the footprint.
The bigger Texas issue is audience ownership. Dallas already has a successful free statewide hockey product, so another franchise would split a territory the Stars have spent years building. The more useful media numbers go beyond No. 6, No. 7, No. 12 or No. 34: how many homes can watch, how easy the games are to find, how often people tune in, and how much of the audience can be turned into sponsors, ticket buyers and direct customer relationships.
The $3.5 Billion Revenue Model
Dallas, Vegas and Seattle give a good sense of what a mature NHL team can earn. Dallas generated approximately $250 million of revenue and $70 million of operating income in 2024 to 2025. Vegas produced $250 million and $77 million, while Seattle reached $235 million and $66 million. Operating margins across the 3 sit around 28% to 31%. Seattle also generated $87 million of gate receipts at an estimated $132 average ticket. A new expansion team would take time to reach similar economics, with heavier staffing, marketing, launch and customer acquisition costs in the early years.
The Year 5 model, expressed in 2026 dollars, uses downside, base and upside cases for each market. Houston reaches $240 million, $290 million and $345 million of revenue. Austin reaches $215 million, $250 million and $315 million. Atlanta reaches $235 million, $280 million and $335 million. Phoenix reaches $230 million, $270 million and $325 million. These are model assumptions, not NHL forecasts. Houston’s $290 million base case is only 16% above current Dallas revenue despite Houston being a much larger market. Austin’s $250 million base case simply gets to today’s Dallas and Vegas level. Atlanta assumes the northern premium strategy works. Phoenix assumes stable ownership and a well located arena can earn far more from the market than the Coyotes managed.
Margins stay below the mature NHL benchmark in most base cases. Houston is modelled at 10%, 24% and 30%, Austin at 5%, 20% and 28%, Atlanta at 8%, 23% and 30%, and Phoenix at 7%, 22% and 29% across downside, base and upside. Team operating income comes to approximately $24 million, $70 million and $104 million for Houston; $11 million, $50 million and $88 million for Austin; $19 million, $64 million and $101 million for Atlanta; and $16 million, $59 million and $94 million for Phoenix.
The arena and surrounding development add another earnings stream. Houston contributes $15 million, $45 million and $75 million of operating income. Austin adds $5 million, $25 million and $50 million. Atlanta adds $20 million, $60 million and $100 million, while Phoenix adds $10 million, $35 million and $65 million. Atlanta carries the largest contribution because the arena sits inside a much bigger development. Houston benefits from scale but has Toyota Center competing for premium events and customers. Phoenix has meaningful upside once a site and ownership platform are in place. Austin contributes the least because Moody Center already captures so much of the city’s premium live entertainment business.
Combine the team with the arena and development, and the base case produces approximately $115 million of operating income in Houston, $75 million in Austin, $124 million in Atlanta and $94 million in Phoenix. Against the same $3.5 billion investment, the operating yield is only 3.3% in Houston, 2.1% in Austin, 3.6% in Atlanta and 2.7% in Phoenix before interest, tax and major capital expenditure. Even the upside case only reaches about 5.1% in Houston, 3.9% in Austin, 5.7% in Atlanta and 4.6% in Phoenix.
The problem is simple. A $3.5 billion cheque is too large to earn an attractive return from annual operating profit alone. The investment needs the franchise, arena and surrounding development to become far more valuable over time.
What Does $2 Billion Need to Become?
Seattle entered the NHL for $650 million and is now worth about $1.85 billion. Vegas paid $500 million and is worth $2.2 billion. Friedkin would begin at $2 billion before spending anything on the arena. Dallas is worth $2.3 billion on $250 million of revenue, Vegas $2.2 billion on the same revenue and Seattle $1.85 billion on $235 million. Their valuations work out to roughly 9.2 times, 8.8 times and 7.9 times revenue. Friedkin is coming in at a price close to what an established NHL team is worth today.
By 2035, a $2 billion franchise fee needs to grow to about $3.68 billion for a 7% return, $4.72 billion for 10% and $5.55 billion for 12%. Add the arena and development and the total investment rises to roughly $3.5 billion. On the same basis, the full platform would need to be worth around $6.43 billion at 7%, $8.25 billion at 10% and $9.71 billion at 12%, before counting any cash distributions along the way. The model assumes all $3.5 billion is invested upfront even though arena spending would come in stages, so the timing is conservative.
The revenue model does not get close to those levels through normal growth alone. Using 2.5% annual inflation through 2035 and an 8.5 times revenue multiple, close to current Dallas, Vegas and Seattle levels, the implied franchise values are about $3.08 billion for Houston, $2.97 billion for Atlanta, $2.87 billion for Phoenix and $2.65 billion for Austin. These are illustrative assumptions, but none gets Friedkin to a 10% return on the $2 billion entry price through ordinary revenue growth and current NHL valuation multiples.
The return has to come from more than running a good hockey team. Friedkin needs some mix of faster revenue growth, higher NHL valuation multiples, stronger premium economics, national media growth and meaningful appreciation in the arena or surrounding district. Vegas bought before the league’s big valuation run. Friedkin is buying after much of it has happened.
The next big NHL ownership return will have to come from what gets built after the purchase.
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